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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
SHARING OF PROFITS AND PRESUMPTION
OF PARTNERSHIP
This note attempts to consider a question as yet believed to be undecided by
Pennsylvania Appellate Courts, namely, whether or not the plaintiff, in order
to establish his prima facie case in a controversy relative to the existence of
partnership between the parties, is required to submit not only evidence of a
participation of profits but also that such participation has not been in lieu of debt,
wages, rent, annuity or interest.
For a great many years, dating from decisions by Lord Mansfield in 1775
and De Grey, C. J., in Grace vs. Smith, 2 W.B. 998 in the same year, down
through that precedent making decision in Waugh vs. Carver, 2 W. B1. 235 in
1793 and continuing with some modifications until Cox vs. Hickman by Lord
Cranworth in 1860, the rule of law in England had been,
"A participation in the profits of a business does, of itself,
by operation of law, constitute a partnership."
In Cox vs. Hickman, 8 H.L. Cas, 268, the present English rule that "the
true test of the existence of a partnership is whether the trade or business has
been carried on in behalf of the person sought to be charged," repudiated the
century old basis of English decisions.
Fundamentally it is on this case and those subsequent to its pronouncement
that a portion of the Uniform Partnership Act of 1915 is premised, viz., "part-
nership liability is restricted to cases of actual partnership, except estoppel and
that the fact of sharing profits is but one situation, not in itself conclusive, to be
considered along with other facts of the case, in determining the existence of a
real partnership relation." (Crane and MaGruder on Partnership p. 59)
This ultimate adoption of the later English attitude on this question in the
Uniform Partnership Act of 1915, despite decisions by the courts of Pennsyl-
vania in Purvince vs. McClintee, 6 S & R 259, and Edwards vs. Tracy, 62 Pa.
374-obsequiously and consistently adhering to the Waugh vs. Carver doctrine,
is a result of a gradual recognition by the Pennsylvania courts of the fundamental
fallacy basic in that doctrine.
An awareness of that fallacy-"that he who takes part of the profits of trade
is taking part of that fund upon which the creditor of the business relies for his
payment"-was indicated in Miller vs. Bartlett, 15 S & R 137, Dunham vs.
Rogers, 1 Pa. 255, Ryder vs. Jacobs, 182 Pa. 624, and Kaufman vs. Kaufman,
222 Pa. 58. It was strongly evidenced in the exceptions enacted in the Statutes
of April 6, 1870 and June 15, 1871 in which profits taken as interest and wages
respectively were determined upon proof presented to rebut such sharing as
conclusive evidence of a co-partnership.
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The ground work was laid therefore and the Pennsylvania Legislature in
the Uniform Partnership Act of 1915, Mar. 26, P.L. 18 adopted the rules rec-
ommended by the codifiers.
Paragraph (1) of Sec. 6 provides-"A partnership is an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
Sec. 7 is the provision relative to the issue herein under consideration. It
provides that, "In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall
apply: (1) except as provided by Sec. 16, persons who are not partners as to
each other are not partners as to third persons." (Sec. 16 provides that as to
relying third parties, a partnership relation may be held to exist on grounds
of estoppel or holding out.)
In Sec. 7 paragraph (4) we find these words: "The receipt by a person of a
share of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in
the business but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received
in payment (b) as wages of an employee..."
This brief review of the vicissitudes of a phase of partnership law in
English and American Courts may assist us in determining the basic query. We
can arrive at the following conclusions. At one time, (1) as to 3rd parties and
creditors a sharing of profits was conclusive evidence of partnership, without
more; (2) As between the parties a sharing of profits was prima facie evidence
of a partnership rebuttable by proof of express pacts or agreements to the con-
trary or evidence of acts and conduct by the parties to the contrary. At the
present time, as between the parties and as to creditors, exclusive of Estoppel,
there is no distinction in the degree of proof required to establish a partnership
relation. The test is "the real intention of the parties, and courts will look to the
substance of the relationship and not the form of the agreement." Thillman
vs. Benton, 82 Md. 64.
The history of this law therefore illustrates convincingly that as between
the parties, when the plaintiff produced evidence of participation of profits he
established a rebuttable presumption of a partnership; that the burden of going
forward with the evidence then shifted to the defendant upon whom there de-
volved the necessity of producing evidence to establish (a) that there was no
sharing of profits, or (b) that such sharing of profits was in lieu of wages, debts,
interest, rent, annuities, etc.
Did the codifiers in the language of Sec. 7 intend that the plaintiff must
produce evidence not only of profit participation but also that such sharing of
profit was not in lieu of other purposes and agreements? Or was their purpose
the restatement of the procedures to which heretofore the legal profession had
adhered? The question can be a matter of some moment in a contested business
relationship. It is very possible that there may be little or no actual evidence of
any agreements or from the conduct of the parties of a partnership relation
except the sharing of profits.
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Suppose plaintiff A in his bill of complaint avers a partnership on the
grounds of a sharing of profits and defendant B in his answer denies the alleged
partnership claiming that A received a share of the profits as compensation for
services rendered in the capacity of an employee. If, in order to establish his
prima facie case, the plaintiff's burden of proof includes (1) a sharing of profits
and (2) evidence of no employer-employee relation, then under the meagerly
available evidence from the conduct of the parties the plaintiff's case falls. But
if the plaintiff need show only a sharing of profits to establish a prima facie case,
then the burden not of proof but of going forward with the evidence shifts to
the defendant who must rebut the presumption of partnership with proof to the
effect that the sharing of the profits of the business was in lieu of wages. Ob-
viously under such a set of facts, if the latter is the interpretation of the statute,
the advantage is clearly with the plaintiff or at least his burden is not so onerous.
In its ultimate analysis the question really is: In the absence of proof to the
contrary, is the sharing of profits conclusive evidence of a partnership?
By the weight of authority the accepted view today is that the sharing
of profits is not per se conclusive evidence of a partnership (20 Ruling Case Law
824) but that the real relationship may be shown from the agreements and the
circumstances and all the facts involved. Southern Can Co. vs. Sayler, 152 Md.
303. A mere sharing of profits will not make the parties partners inter sese,
whatever it may do as to third persons, unless they so intend it.
Whether or not a partnership exists is a'question of fact and written ar-
ticles of agreement are not necessary to prove a partnership; such a relation may
exist under a verbal contract. Mattei et al, vs. Masci Appellant, 351 Pa. 93.
However, the equity court will not enforce an alleged contract of partnership
unless it is complete and certain in all its essential elements. Beaver, Appellant
vs. Slane, 271 Pa. 317. The receipt of a share of profits of a business as com-
pensation for services does not make the recipient a partner. Frazier, Appellant
vs. Mansfield et al., 305 Pa. 359.
While no one fact or circumstances can be taken as an unfailing criterion
as to the existence of a partnership, still it does not appear that the courts will go
so far away from their traditions on this question as to rule that in absence of
proof to the contrary, a sharing of profits in itself does not establish a prima facie
case, and if unsuccessfully assailed will not stand as conclusive evidence of a
partnerhip.
In the case of Gibbs Estate, 157 Pa. 59, the Court said:
"The best evidence of the existence of a partnership is the
contract creating it. If proof of the contract is not within
reach, its existence may be inferred from proof of contribu-
tions to the partnership stock. If direct proof of contributions
cannot be had it may be inferred from participation in profits.
Participation in profits is not conclusive proof of the existence
of the partnership relations, Edwards vs. Tracy, 62 Pa. 374;
but both in England and in this country it is cogent evidence
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upon the question. It puts the defendant upon his proofs ex-
planatory. If he is able to show that such participation was
referable to some other reason such as compensation for serv-
ices rendered by him as agent, broker, salesman or otherwise,
the prima facie case is overcome."
We should be able to conclude therefore, at least from the historical aspect
of the question, that the introduction by the plaintiff of evidence of a sharing
of profits establishes his prima facie case and that the defendant must come for-
ward with proof of participation in profits for purposes other than those of a
partnership relation.
Aside from the historical view of this question there is considerable au-
thority which lends itself favorably to the contention that the provision of Sec.
7, para. 4 of the Uniform Partnership Act raises a presumption of a partnership
upon presentation of evidence of profit participation. However, in accordance
with prevailing rules, the probative force of the circumstance is the not conclusive
on the question and may be rebutted by a showing of fact to the contrary.' And
if it is not so rebutted it is deemed sufficient to establish the fact of partnership. 2
The Court in Zenner vs. Goetz, 324 Pa. 432, said:
"It is seldom if ever, the duty of a litigant to prove a negative
until his opponent has come forward to prove the opposing
positive."
It is extremely doubtful therefore that Pennsylvania courts will hold that
the words in para. 4, "and no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were
received in payment: as wages to an employee . . ." - throw the burden of
showing the fact of employment on the plaintiff. From the language context
alone it seems logical that the codifiers intended a sharing of profits to be an
inference of partnership rebuttable by evidence to the contrary.
The court in Kruss vs. Guzy, 36 Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep. 278 said:
"The statute provides that receipt of a share of the profits of
a business is prima facie evidence of a partnership. The alle-
gations of the statement therefore shift the burden of proof
to the defendant."
What this court meant was that the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence shifted to the defendant. For Chief Justice Maxey said in Zenner vs.
Goetz, supra:
"A defendant's duty of coming forward with the evidence
at certain stages of the trial is sometimes loosely referred to
as the burden of proof. The burden of proof throughout the
trial rests on the party affirming facts in support of his case
against a defendant, while the burden of coming forward
with the evidence may shift from side to side during the pro-
147 Corpus Juris, Partnership, Sec. 63; In re Hayne, 277 Fed. 668; Martin vs. Peyton, 246 N. Y.
213; Lefeore vs. Silo, 96 N. Y. 321; Neserve vs. Andrew, 104 Mass. 360; Walker vs. Tupper,
152 Pa. 1.2 Fletcher vs. Palm, 133 Fed. 462; Martin vs. Peyton, 246 N. Y. 213; Towland vs. Long, 45 Md.
439.
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gress of the trial. It is well recognized principal of evidence
that he who has the positive of any proposition is the party
called upon to offer proof of it."
Chief Justice Maxey also wrote the opinion in Renes vs. McGoven, 317 Pa.
302. In this case he cites the case of Abrath vs. N. E. Ry. Co., 32 W.R.
50, 53 as standing for this proposition:
"In every law suit somebody must go on with it; the plaintiff
is the first to begin, and if he does nothing he fails. If he
makes a prima facie case and nothing is done by the other
side to answer it, the defendant fails. The test, therefore, as
to burden of proof is simply to consider which party would
be successful if no evidence at all was given, or if no rnore
evidence was given than is given at this particular point of
the case; because it is obvious that during the controversy in
the litigation there are points at which the onus of proof shifts,
and at which the tribunal must say, if the case stopped there,
that it must be decided in a particular way. Such being the
test, it is not a burden which rests forever on the person on
whom it is first cast, but as soon as he, in his turn, finds evi-
dence which, prima facie, rebuts the evidence against which
he is contending, the burden shifts until again there is evidence
which satisfies the demand. Now, that being so, the question
as to onus of proof is only a rule for deciding on whom the
obligation rests, of going forward further, if he wishes to
win.
If a court should hold that the receipt by a plaintiff of a share of profits
does not shift the burden of going forward with evidence to defendant upon
evidence produced of such participation by the plaintiff, such decision would de-
pend entirely upon a determination of the extent of proof necessary to set up
a prima facie case:
1. If the act is to be so interpreted as to require the plaintiff
to establish (1) sharing of profits, (2) no employee relation
and (3) other circumstances of partnership relation, in order
to set up his prima facie case then of course the burden of
coming forward with the evidence will not shift to the de-
fendant until such facts are amply shown.
2. If the act requires the plaintiff to show a sharing of pro-
fits only to set up his prima facie case then the burden shifts
to the defendant to prove that the plaintiff was an employee
and received a division .of profits as wages.
The writer is inclined to the opinion, with some reservation, that from the
historical development of this phase of partnership law, from the weight of
authority by dicta in various cited cases, from the seemingly obvious intent of
the codifiers in their language usage, and from the rules of evidence, that the
plaintiff need but show a sharing of profits to establish his prima facie case and
the burden then shifts to the defendant to bring forth evidence that such shar-
ing was in lieu of wages, debt, interest or rent as the case may be.
STANLEY G. STROUP
